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Abstract
We model agents in a network game of strategic complements
and negative externalities. Sufficient conditions for the existence of
a unique Nash equilibrium and of a unique social optimum are es-
tablished. Under these conditions, we find that players with more
vulnerable locations in the network exert more effort at equilibrium,
and that the most influential players should exert less effort at effi-
ciency. We then find structural conditions under which each player
exerts strictly more effort than her efficient level, whether the social
optimum be interior or not.
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1 Introduction
Although social dilemmas are situations in which individual and collective
interests are in conflict, their outcome depends heavily on the nature of social
(or geographic) interactions. By considering the case where a social dilemma
is embedded in a directed and weighted network, this present paper engages
the classic question of which social (or geographic) structures are conducives
to a “ social tragedy ” and shows that social (or geographic) structure, pure
strategy Nash equilibrium (henceforth PSNE) and social optimum (hence-
forth SO) are related in a mutually interesting way.
Here we consider a simultaneous-move game in which each player is more
likely to exert an effort whenever her neighbors are exerting an effort, in
other words, we assume that efforts are local complements. In addition, it is
assumed that higher levels of effort by neighbors lower a player’s payoff, i.e.,
we consider a game in which efforts generate local negative externalities. Our
model is thus a network game of strategic complements and negative exter-
nalities. Examples of application include: advertising expenditures by firms
that produce brand-differentiated substitute goods; investments in training,
in infrastructure or in talents by teams in competition for a professional or
sporting challenge; campaign commitments and spendings by candidates in
an election; research and educational investments by universities and higher
education institutions, etc.
The main result is to establish conditions on the structure of the network
for a social tragedy, whether the SO be interior or not. First, we find sufficient
conditions under which the PSNE exists and we show that in that case, it
is unique and interior. These results can be seen as applications of Kennan
(2001)’s uniqueness result to the case of games with local complementarities.
Our contributions here are to highlight the role of local interactions between
neighboring agents and to relate equilibrium behaviors to network centrality
measures. Using a modified version of the Bonacich centrality measure, we
show that players with more vulnerable locations in the network exert more
effort at equilibrium.
Then, we find sufficient conditions under which the SO exists and is
unique. Using another modified version of the Bonacich centrality measure,
we prove that the efficient profile is a fixed point, we derive a structural
condition for the SO to be interior and we show that the most influential
players should exert less effort at efficiency. Our proofs are simple, intuitive
and based on standard optimization techniques. Then, we show that there
is always at least one player that exerts strictly more effort than her efficient
level and we find structural conditions under which this is the case for each
player. We call this situation a social tragedy. In general, such a situation
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appears whenever each player has a successor. But when the SO is interior,
it appears if and only if each player has a successor or a predecessor.
The paper is built on the assumption that the most basic and common
mechanism for a social tragedy is the bandwagon effect (or fashion effect):
an agent will behave in a certain way because some or all of his neighbors
also behave in that way. Hence, the effort level exerted by an agent depends
positively on the effort levels exerted by some or all of his neighbors, which
depend themselves positively on the effort levels exerted by some or all of
their neighbors, and so on. The mechanism’s similarity to the contagion of
cheating behavior is not really appropriate; we do not consider a threshold
above which effort would become illegal, i.e., there is no risk of getting caught,
agents are not facing a lottery (see, e.g., Pascual-Ezama et al., 2013). Note
also that we do not allow agents to forge alliance with other agents. In our
game, all the players are “ enemies ” (direct or indirect).
The main motivation of the model is collective wasteful behavior towards
goods such as power, prestige or status. The welfare losses caused by con-
sumption of such goods have been established by Hirsch (1976) and Frank
(1985) and is clearly demonstrated by increased investments made, in some
occasions, by rival agents: from the early 1950s through the mid-1960s, the
US brewing industry was involved in a “ game of market power ”, the advertis-
ing spending per barrel rising from $5.00 in 1950 to $8.10 in 1963 (Tremblay
and Tremblay, 2007, p. 68); for several years now, US colleges and universities
are clearly engaged in a “ game of educational prestige ”, seeking to attract
the best students through increased spending or reduced price (Winston,
2000). A structural analysis of collective wasteful behavior towards status
goes back at least to Thorstein Veblen, who saw the consumption of some
goods or services as “ conspicuous expenditures ” driven by “ the stimulus of
an invidious comparison which prompts us to outdo those with whom we
are in the habit of classing ourselves ” (Veblen, 1899, p. 103). Interestingly,
Veblen emphasized the role of the hierarchic structure of social classes (di-
rected network) on the diffusion of the pecuniary standard of living (wasteful
behavior).
2 Model
There are n players and the set of players is N = {1, . . . , n}. Each player
l ∈ N chooses simultaneously a level of absolute effort xl ∈ IR+. E.g., the
players could be firms producing brand-differentiated substitute goods and
xl could be the strategy of firm l’s in advertising expenditures. We assume
that the cost of a unit of xl is wl. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) denote an effort profile
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of all players.
Players are arranged in a network, which we represent as a weighted
directed graph G which consists of a set of nodes (the players), a set of arcs
(the directed links between players) and a mapping from the set of arcs to
a set of positive weights (the intensities of the directed links). We will use
kl to denote an arc directed from node k to node l. If kl is an arc, then
we say that node l is a vulnerable neighbor of node k, or that node k is
an influential neighbor of node l. A directed path in G is a sequence of
distinct nodes connected by arcs corresponding to the order of the nodes in
the sequence. The length of a directed path is its number of arcs. The weight
of a directed path is the product of the weights of its arcs. To continue our
example, the network could reflect the geographic structure of competition
among firms. Two firms compete only when they are geographic neighbors.
In that case, these two firms are linked, the direction and the intensity of
the link reflecting the balance between their relative market powers (due, for
instance, to the quality of the goods being produced).
The basic representation of G is given by its weighted n × n adjacency
matrix Λ = [λkl] ∈ IR
n×n
+ where λkl > 0 if kl is an arc and λkl = 0 otherwise
(by convention λkk = 0). Let ρ(Λ) denote the spectral radius of the network.
For the rest of the paper, we require:
Assumption A0. ρ (Λ) < 1.
Since Λ ≥ 0, it is well-known that A0 holds if and only if (I − Λ)−1 exists
and is nonnegative (Berman and Plemmons, 1979). Therefore,
M = (I−Λ)−1 =
∞∑
i=0
Λi,
hence M ≥ I+Λ ≥ I. The entry mkl counts the total weight of all directed
paths in G starting at node k and ending at node l.
We suppose that the players are “ enemies ” and hence that network ex-
ternalities are negative. Let el denote player l’s effective effort, defined as
the difference between player l’s absolute effort level with the absolute effort
levels of her influential neighbors multiplied by the corresponding weights.
Players value their effective effort according to a twice differentiable strictly
concave value function fl(el) defined on IR with f
′
l > 0 and f
′′
l < 0 for all
l. According to our assumptions stated above, the resulting effective effort
is determined according to el = xl −
∑
k:k 6=l λklxk. E.g., fl(el) could be the
value (measured in monetary units) to firm l of advertising expenditures x
of all firms.
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The payoff function of player l, defined for all effort profile x ≥ 0, is given
by
Ul (x) = fl
(
xl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk
)
− wlxl,
and we note G(Λ, f ,w) the simultaneous-move game with payoffs Ul : IR
n
+ →
IR and strategy space xl ≥ 0 for each player l ∈ N , where f is the vector of
value functions and w the vector of marginal costs. Since ∂Ul/∂xk ≤ 0 for
all k 6= l, this is a game of negative externalities, and since ∂2Ul/∂xk∂xl ≥ 0
for all k 6= l, this is a game of strategic complements.
In our game, the effort space is the positive real line and the payoffs are
strictly concave, so every mixed strategy is dominated by its average pure
strategy which is available. Then, we study Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
For the equilibrium analysis, we require:
Assumption A1. For all l ∈ N , f ′l (0) > wl and wl > f
′
l (∞).
This assumption, called the boundary conditions, guarantees that each player
will exert a positive and finite level of absolute effort at equilibrium. Let
x∗l = (f
′
l )
−1(wl) denote player l’s uninfluenced equilibrium effort and for ease
of exposition, we will write x∗ = (f ′)−1(w). Under A1, x∗l is positive and
finite, i.e., a player with no influential neighbors still exerts a positive and
finite equilibrium effort level. Hence, the associated reactions functions are
linear in strategies:
∀l ∈ N, xl (x−l) = x
∗
l +
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk,
where x−l is the strategy vector x with player l’s strategy removed. This
allows us to find PSNE by solving a linear problem and we look for a closed-
form solution.
For a weighted adjacency matrix Λ ∈ IRn×n+ , the Bonacich centrality
measure is given by
c (α, β,Λ, 1) = α (I− βΛ)−1Λ1,
where 1 is the vector of ones and α, β ∈ IR are two scalars (Bonacich, 1987).
Under A0, we have the following power expansion:
c (α, β,Λ, 1) = α
∞∑
i=0
βiΛi+11.
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When β is positive, c(1, β,Λ, 1) denotes the expected number of influences
directly or indirectly caused by a node. The Bonacich centrality measure has
proved to be very useful to provide geometric intuitions of how equilibrium
efforts are related to network position in a variety of network games (Ballester
et al., 2006; Corbo et al., 2007; Ballester and Calvo´-Armengol, 2010; Ilkilic¸,
2010; Allouch, 2012; Re´bille´ and Richefort, 2012a; Bramoulle´ et al., 2013).
We introduce a modified version of the Bonacich centrality measure.
Definition 1. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0, the vector
b− (Λ,x∗) = x∗ + c
(
1, 1,ΛT,x∗
)
=
(
I−ΛT
)−1
x∗
is called the vulnerability measure.
Using the power expansion presented above, we observe that the vulner-
ability measure of a player l in the network is a sum of her uninfluenced
equilibrium effort x∗l with the total weight of all directed paths that end
at her in the network, where a directed path that starts at player k 6= l
is weighted by x∗k, the uninfluenced equilibrium effort of the corresponding
player. Hence, having many influential neighbors increases vulnerability, and
if one player’s influential neighbors themselves have many influential neigh-
bors, vulnerability is increased, and so on.
Example 1 (Acyclic network). There are four firms (players) that produce
brand-differentiated substitute goods. Each firm must choose her advertis-
ing expenditures. Firm 3 is a geographic neighbor of all the other firms, and
all the other firms are only geographic neighbors to firm 3. Firms 1 and 2
produce goods of better quality than firm 3, who produces herself a good of
better quality than firm 4. The geographic structure of competition among
the four firms is given by the following weighted directed network:
1 2
3
4
λ13 λ23
λ34
Figure 1: An acyclic network with four players
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Since the network is acyclic, ρ(Λ) = 0 (Nicholson, 1975). Then, A0 is always
satisfied. For all firm l ∈ N = {1, . . . , 4}, let
Ul (x) = 1− exp
(
−
(
xl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk
))
−
1
2
xl
where xl is firm l’s advertising expenditures and λkl is the intensity of the
influence from firm k to firm l. For ease of exposition, we set the intensity
of each influence to 0.5 (i.e., λ13 = λ23 = λ34 = 0.5). We get
b− (Λ,x∗) =


ln (2)
ln (2)
2 ln (2)
2 ln (2)

 ,
so firms 3 and 4 have the most vulnerable locations.
Letting xˆ ≥ 0 denote a PSNE of G(Λ, f ,w), we obtain the following
result.
Proposition 1. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0 and A1, the PSNE
exists, is unique and is interior. Moreover,
xˆ = b− (Λ,x∗) = b−
(
Λ, (f ′)
−1
(w)
)
≥ x∗
and for all l ∈ N ,
Ul (xˆ) = fl (x
∗
l )− wlxˆl.
The interpretation is straightforward. When the boundary conditions are
met and when the spectral radius of the network is sufficiently low, the PSNE
exists, is unique, is interior and is such that players with a more vulnerable
location in the network exert a higher level of absolute effort (if the spectral
radius is too high, no PSNE exists; see, e.g., Ballester et al., 2006; Corbo
et al., 2007). When the network is undirected, the spectral condition can
be interpreted as follows (see, e.g., Ballester and Calvo´-Armengol, 2010):
the game G(Λ, f ,w) admits a unique PSNE whenever the network is not too
much dense. When the network is directed, things are less clear, although A0
still carries details on the topological structure of the network (for a survey
of results on the spectra of graphs, see Cvetkovic and Rowlinson, 1990, and
for a survey of results on the spectra of directed graphs, see Brualdi, 2010).
We now turn to examine social optima.
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4 Welfare Analysis
The social welfare or efficiency of a strategy profile in G(Λ, f ,w) is defined
as the sum of payoffs of all players. Let SW be the social welfare function
defined for all x ≥ 0 by
SW (x) =
∑
l
fl
(
xl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk
)
− wlxl.
An effort profile is said to be socially optimal or efficient if it maximizes
the social welfare function. Thus, the efficient behavior of a player depends
on how she is impacted by her predecessors’ behavior and how she impacts
her successors’ behavior. Consequently, we need an opposite version of the
vulnerability measure for getting a characterization of the efficient profile.
Definition 2. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0, the vector
b+ (Λ,w) = w + c (1, 1,Λ,w) = (I−Λ)−1w
is called the influence measure.
Using the power expansion presented in the previous section, we observe
that the influence measure of a player l in the network is a sum of her marginal
cost of absolute effort wl with the total weight of all directed paths that
start at her in the network, where a directed path that ends at player k 6= l
is weighted by wk, the marginal cost of absolute effort of the correspond-
ing player. Hence, having many vulnerable neighbors increases influence,
and if one player’s vulnerable neighbors themselves have many vulnerable
neighbors, influence is increased, and so on.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). We get
b+ (Λ,w) =


7/8
7/8
3/4
1/2

 ,
so firms 1 and 2 are the most influential firms.
We prove that SW is strictly concave whenever A0 is met and reaches
a maximum on a compact and non-empty set if A1 is satisfied. This allows
us to derive an existence and uniqueness result for the SO. In addition, we
show that the efficient effort profile is a fixed point when the SO is corner.
Let D = {l : x˜l > 0}, D¯ its complement and x˜ ≥ 0 the SO of G(Λ, f ,w).
8
Theorem 1. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0 and A1, the SO exists, is
unique and is a fixed point, i.e.,
x˜D = b
−
(
ΛD×D, (f
′)
−1 (
b+ (ΛD×D,φ (x˜D))
))
,
where φ(x˜D) = wD +ΛD×D¯ f
′(−ΛD×D¯
T x˜D).
This formula provides intuitions on how efficient behavior is related to
centrality. When D 6= N , there are inactive players at efficiency and the
efficient efforts of the active players can be computed by solving the fixed
point equation. When D = N , the SO is interior. In that case, φ(x˜D) =
wD. The efficient efforts of the active players are constant and given by a
combination of the vulnerability and the influence measures. In that case,
the connection between PSNE and SO can be established. Then, we now
look for structural conditions under which the SO is interior. We require:
Assumption A2. For all l ∈ N , f ′l (0) > b
+
l (Λ,w) and wl > f
′
l (∞).
This assumption, called the modified boundary conditions, guarantees that
each player should exert a positive and finite level of absolute effort at effi-
ciency (note that since b+l (Λ,w) ≥ wl, A1 holds whenever A2 holds). Let
x˜∗l = (f
′
l )
−1(b+l (Λ,w)) denote player l’s uninfluenced efficient effort and for
ease of exposition, we will write x˜∗ = (f ′)−1(b+(Λ,w)). Under A2, x˜∗l is
positive and finite, i.e., a player with no influential neighbors still has a pos-
itive and finite efficient effort level. Hence, the first order conditions become
linear in efforts:
∀l ∈ N, xl (x−l) = x˜
∗
l +
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk.
We obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0 and A2, the SO exists,
is unique and is interior. Moreover,
x˜ = b− (Λ, x˜∗) = b−
(
Λ, (f ′)
−1 (
b+ (Λ,w)
))
≥ x˜∗
and for all l ∈ N ,
Ul (x˜) = fl (x˜
∗
l )− wlx˜l.
The interpretation is as follows. When the modified boundary conditions
are met and when the spectral radius of the network is sufficiently low, the
SO exists, is unique, is interior and is such that players with a more influential
location in the network should exert a lower level of absolute effort. Then,
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b−(Λ, x˜∗) can be interpreted as the social vulnerability measure: players
with a more socially vulnerable location in the network should exert a higher
level of absolute effort at efficiency. Interestingly, this result is in line with the
closed-form expression obtained for the SO in games with substitutabilities
(Re´bille´ and Richefort, 2012a and 2012b). Moreover, it holds even if we
consider social welfare functions that are weighted sums of individual payoffs.
Remark 1 (Weighted social welfare functions). More generally, the social
welfare function could be weighted, reflecting the interest of the social planner
for the various players with respect to their location in the network. Let
α = (α1, . . . , αn) >> 0 be social weights and consider the social welfare
function ∑
l
αl
(
fl
(
xl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk
)
− wlxl
)
.
Then, the SO is given by
x˜ = b−
(
Λ, (f ′)
−1
(
1
α
b+ (Λ,αw)
))
.
where (1/α)l = 1/αl and (αw)l = αlwl for all l, provided that A2 holds
(that is, provided that αlf
′
l (0) > b
+
l (Λ,αw) and wl > f
′
l (∞) for all l).
5 Social Tragedy in Networks
From now on, we assume that Λ 6= 0. The fact that in network games (of
strategic complements or strategic substitutes), the PSNE is always ineffi-
cient is not surprising because players do not take into account the (positive
or negative) externalities which they generate on their successors. How-
ever, network games of strategic complements differed from network games
of strategic substitutes in that the best response of each player is increasing
in efforts of her direct predecessors. Then, when externalities are negative,
we shall prove the following result.
Theorem 2. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0 and A1, each player
exerts as much or more effort than her efficient level with at least one player
exerting strictly more effort, i.e., x˜ < xˆ.
This result entails that when a PSNE exists, too much collective effort is
always exerted at equilibrium, i.e.,
∑
l x˜l <
∑
l xˆl, whether the SO be interior
or not. There may exist, however, some players whose equilibrium effort level
is equal to their efficient effort level. Next, we consider the situation in which
each player exerts strictly more effort than her efficient level.
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Definition 3. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0 and A1, a situation in
which
x˜ << xˆ
is called a social tragedy.
A player who has no successors, i.e., a sink player, does not generate
externalities. Such a player has the particularity that her uninfluenced effi-
cient effort is equal to her uninfluenced equilibrium effort. This observation
provides the intuition for our next result, that shows that network games
without sink players always lead to a social tragedy, even if the SO is corner.
Corollary 1. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0 and A1, there exists a
social tragedy whenever there are no sink players.
Typical examples of network games without sink players are games played
in undirected networks (with uniform or non-uniform weights attached to
the undirected links). The proof clearly shows, however, that the no sink
property is only sufficient. In other words, there exists games with comple-
mentarities which lead to a social tragedy even if there are sink players. The
following example illustrates this point.
Example 3 (Example 1 modified). Consider the same network structure as
in example 1, but with the following modified payoffs. For all l ∈ N =
{1, . . . , 4}, let
Ul (x) = 1− exp
(
−
(
xl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk
))
−
3
5
xl.
Assumptions A0 and A1 are met while A2 is not (we still assume that λ13 =
λ23 = λ34 = 0.5). We get
xˆ =


ln (5/3)
ln (5/3)
2 ln (5/3)
2 ln (5/3)

 and x˜ =


0
0
ln (10/9)
1/2 ln (2/3) + 3/2 ln (5/3)

 .
Firm 4 is a sink player, but the game still leads to a social tragedy, x˜ << xˆ.
A player who has neither successors nor predecessors, i.e., an isolated
player, does not generate and is not impacted by externalities. Such a player
has the particularity that her efficient effort is equal to her equilibrium effort.
Clearly, the absence of isolated players is a necessary condition for the ap-
pearance of a social tragedy. Moreover, the SO is interior under A0 and A2.
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In that case, the efficient profile of G(Λ, f ,w) can be interpreted as a PSNE
of another game with “modified ” uninfluenced equilibrium efforts. That is,
we have
x˜ = b− (Λ, x˜∗) ,
where
x˜∗ = (f ′)
−1 (
b+ (Λ,w)
)
≤ (f ′)
−1
(w) = x∗.
This last observation leads us directly to our next result, that shows that
when the SO is interior, the absence of isolated players becomes a sufficient
condition for the appearance of a social tragedy.
Theorem 3. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0 and A2, there exists a
social tragedy if and only if there are no isolated players.
It is worth noting that under A0 and A2, the global over effort and the
resulting loss in welfare can be computed, thanks to Proposition 2. The
global over effort is given by
xˆ− x˜ = b+ (Λ,x∗ − x˜∗) >> 0
and the loss in welfare is given by
∑
l
Ul (x˜)− Ul (xˆ) ∈
(
0,
∑
l
wl (xˆl − x˜l)
)
.
These measures indicate the performance of the network and interestingly,
they both depend on network centrality measures.
Then, a situation in which x˜l < xˆl for all l appears if and only if each
player has at least one (influential or vulnerable) neighbor, provided that
the SO is interior. The reason is that players, who are rational and selfish,
are trapped in a continuous prisoner’s dilemma. Many continuous prisoner’s
dilemmas can be found in the literature, and a large majority of them have
been developed from an underlying social dilemma (Eaton, 2004; Acharya
and Ramsay, 2013). Depending on the nature of the interactions among
players, social dilemma games can be classified into four groups (i.e., games
of strategic substitutes/complements and negative/positive externalities; see
Eaton, 2004).
A famous multi-player generalization of the prisoner’s dilemma is the com-
mons dilemma, which leads to what has become known as the “ tragedy of
the commons ” (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1960). Our results are closely related
to such a situation, since the commons dilemma is generally represented as a
game of negative externalities (see, e.g., Hardin, 1971; Cornes and Sandler,
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1983; Gardner et al., 1994). With the exception of Ilkilic¸ (2010), this liter-
ature typically assumes that players are arranged in a complete, undirected
network (even if the assumption on the completeness of the network is gener-
ally not explicitly stated). Taking our previous example on firms producing
brand-differentiated substitute goods, Corollary 2 and Theorem 3 may then
be interpreted as a “ tragedy of the commons in networks ”, with xl repre-
senting the share of a common-pool resource consumed by firm l (individual
consumptions are strategic complements when users imitate each other, and
generate negative externalities when the consumption by one user reduces
the quantity available for other users). The following example illustrates a
social tragedy when the SO is interior.
Example 4 (Example 1 continued). Since fl(el) = 1− exp(−el) and wl = 1/2
for all l, Assumption A2 is satisfied. So the PSNE and the SO are both
unique and interior. We get
xˆ =


ln (2)
ln (2)
2 ln (2)
2 ln (2)

 and x˜ =


ln (8/7)
ln (8/7)
ln (32/21)
1/2 ln (128/21)

 ,
so x˜ << xˆ, i.e., a social tragedy always appears.
Though this example focus on acyclic networks, it is worth noting that
our results are not restricted to such network structures; they apply to each
kind of network, i.e., with or withtout cycles, directed or undirected, weighted
or unweighted, connected or disconnected, etc. Moreover, it is interesting to
note that, whatever the network structure, a social tragedy always appears
for people belonging to a “ community ”.
Corollary 2. Let G(Λ, f ,w) be a game. Under A0 and A2, there exists a
social tragedy for non-isolated players, i.e., x˜l < xˆl if and only if l is not
isolated, otherwise x˜l = xˆl = x
∗
l .
In the economic theory of negative externalities, the focus is on how to
share and reduce the cost due to the external effects (Montgomery, 1972;
Baumol and Oates, 1988). One well known way to perform this goal is
to impose a tax mechanism which achieves the efficient profile (this is the
so-called “Pigouvian ” tax when negative externalities are pollution). The
mechanism punishes players for their deviations from the efficient effort level
and hence, players prefer to exert the efficient effort level. In networks, it
appears that each player should pay a tax that is precisely equal to the
difference between her influence measure and her marginal cost of absolute
effort. Thus, the more influential a player, the higher her optimal tax.
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Remark 2 (Optimal tax). The SO of game G(Λ, f ,w) may be restored through
a tax plan on marginal costs. Assume A2 holds (with w). Following Propo-
sition 2, we obtain
x˜ (Λ,w) = b−
(
Λ, (f ′)
−1 (
b+ (Λ,w)
))
.
Let us introduce the tax rate as follows
τ = b+ (Λ,w)−w = Λb+ (Λ,w) ≥ 0.
Then, A2 holds (with w + τ ) and by Proposition 1, the PSNE of game
G(Λ, f ,w + τ ) is given by
xˆ (Λ,w + τ ) = b−
(
Λ, (f ′)
−1
(w + τ )
)
= x˜ (Λ,w) .
Therefore, the network matters to restore optimality in game G(Λ, f ,w), i.e.,
the optimal tax plan involves different tax rate at each location throughout
the network.
Finally, it is worth noting that our results hold even if we consider
weighted social welfare functions.
Remark 3 (Weighted social welfare functions continued). Let us remind that
a PSNE is an ordinal property. Thus, whatever the social weights α =
(α1, . . . , αn) >> 0 chosen to satisfy A2, the corresponding SO will also satisfy
x˜(α) << xˆ if and only if there are no isolated players, leading therefore to a
social tragedy.
6 Discussion
This work is related to the branch of the literature on social dilemmas that
study games of strategic complements and negative externalities. This line of
research has been pioneered by Augustin Cournot (1838, ch. IX), who devel-
oped a model where two component goods are produced to form a composite
good (e.g., copper and zinc to form brass). This model is referred by Eaton
(2004) as the “Cournot model of price competition ”. In a way, we extend
this model by adding a (social or geographic) network structure between the
players. We now discuss the main assumptions we use for its analysis.
In our game, we assume that efforts are unbounded. When efforts are
bounded from above, there always exists a unique PSNE which can not be
characterized through the Bonacich centrality measure (Belhaj et al., 2012).
When efforts are unbounded, we show that there exists a unique PSNE when-
ever the spectral radius of the network is sufficiently low (A0). This condition
14
is known to guarantee the uniqueness of PSNE in network games of strate-
gic complements or strategic substitutes (Ballester et al., 2006; Corbo et al.,
2007; Ballester and Calvo´-Armengol, 2010). Recent research on the unique-
ness of PSNE in network games of strategic substitutes has moved beyond
this spectral condition, showing that the lowest eigenvalue is key to PSNE
outcomes when the network is undirected (Bramoulle´ et al., 2013; Re´bille´
and Richefort, 2013). In network games of strategic complements, there is
no equilibrium whenever A0 is not met (Ballester et al., 2006; Corbo et al.,
2007; Ballester and Calvo´-Armengol, 2010). Interestingly, our paper is the
first, to our knowledge, to highlight the role of A0 for the uniqueness and
the characterization of SO in such games, and for the appearance of a social
tragedy.
The quasi-linear preferences we consider, although restrictive, help us
focus on the effects of network structure at equilibrium and at efficiency. This
class of preferences allows us to formulate the equilibrium and the efficient
efforts in terms of the directed paths that end and start at each player in the
network. These results are in line with previous PSNE characterizations in
various network games using bilinear payoffs (Ballester et al., 2006; Corbo
et al., 2007) or quasi-linear payoffs (Ballester and Calvo´-Armengol, 2010;
Bramoulle´ et al., 2013). In our paper, the relevance to consider quasi-linear
preferences to study a game of strategic complements is that it allows us to
compare PSNE to SO and to quantify this comparison (such a comparison is
an open issue in network games of strategic substitutes because directed paths
of even and odd length have opposing signs in the closed-form expressions of
PSNE and SO; see Re´bille´ and Richefort, 2012a and 2012b).
In our model, preferences are taken to be cardinal, thus admitting only
an interpretation in terms of benefits and costs. A useful direction for further
research would be to consider payoffs that increase as players improve their
position in some ordinal ranking produced by the game, where orderings of
the players could represent how well they have done in the game relative to
their neighbors (Brandt et al., 2009; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2009). In this
regard, a status loss function should be added to individual payoffs (see, e.g.,
Immorlica et al., 2012). This will be the next step on our research agenda.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let l ∈ N and x ∈ IRn. Player l maximizes her
payoff function without constraint given others efforts x−l. The first order
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conditions are sufficient and are the following:
U ′l (xl,x−l) = f
′
l
(
xl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk
)
− wl = 0,
equivalently,
xl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk = (f
′
l )
−1
(wl) = x
∗
l ,
and in matrix notation, (
I−ΛT
)
x = x∗.
Now, I −Λ has a nonnegative inverse, thus the unique PSNE xˆ is obtained
by
xˆ =
(
I−ΛT
)−1
x∗ ≥ x∗ >> 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. (Existence). We shall build a sufficiently large box
where the maximum is reached. Let x ≥ 0. We have, by increasingness
of the fl’s,
SW (x) ≤
n∑
l=1
fl (xl)− wlxl.
Under A1, for all l, f ′l (∞) < wl < f
′
l (0), so there exists xl > 0 such that
f ′l (xl) < wl. Since fl is strictly concave and differentiable for all l, the
convexity inequality entails
fl (xl) ≤ fl (xl) + f
′
l (x) (xl − xl)
and also
fl (0) < fl (xl)− f
′
l (x)xl.
Thus,
SW (x) ≤
n∑
l=1
fl (xl) + f
′
l (x) (xl − xl)− wlxl
=
n∑
l=1
fl (xl)− f
′
l (x)xl − (wl − f
′
l (x))xl
≤ A− B
(
n∑
i=1
xl
)
where A =
∑n
l=1 fl(xl) − f
′
l (x)xl and B = minl wl − f
′
l (x) (> 0). So by the
convexity inequality, A >
∑n
l=1 fl(0) = SW (0).
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Hence, if
∑n
l=1 xl > C = (A− SW (0)) /B (> 0) then SW (x) < SW (0).
So, being continuous, SW reaches a maximum on ∆ = {x ≥ 0 :
∑n
l=1 xl ≤
C} which is compact and non-empty (0 ∈ ∆), hence on IRn+ since SW (x) <
SW (0) whenever x /∈ ∆.
(Uniqueness). Let us prove that SW is strictly concave. We may ignore
the linear part, we shall show that the following function F is strictly concave
where
F (x) =
∑
l
fl
(
xl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxk
)
, x ≥ 0 .
Let x′,x′′ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1) with x′ 6= x′′. Under A0, I − Λ is invertible so
I−ΛT is invertible too. Now, there exists some l0 such that((
I−ΛT
)
x′
)
l0
6=
((
I−ΛT
)
x′′
)
l0
,
that is,
x′l0 −
∑
k:k 6=l0
λkl0x
′
k 6= x
′′
l0
−
∑
k:k 6=l0
λkl0x
′′
k.
By strict concavity of fl0 and concavity of fl for l 6= l0 it comes
fl0
(
θ
(
x′l0 −
∑
k:k 6=l0
λkl0x
′
k
)
+ (1− θ)
(
x′′l0 −
∑
k:k 6=l0
λkl0x
′′
k
))
> θfl0
(
x′l0 −
∑
k:k 6=l0
λkl0x
′
k
)
+ (1− θ) fl0
(
x′′l0 −
∑
k:k 6=l0
λkl0x
′′
k
)
and
fl
(
θ
(
x′l −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklx
′
k
)
+ (1− θ)
(
x′′l −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklx
′′
k
))
≥ θfl
(
x′l −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklx
′
k
)
+ (1− θ)fl
(
x′′l −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklx
′′
k
)
.
Summing these inequalities over i, we obtain
F (θx′ + (1− θ)x′′) > θF (x′) + (1− θ)F (x′′)
and this establishes strong concavity of F , thus strong concavity of SW .
Therefore SW ’s maximum is unique.
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(Characterization.) Let D = {l : x˜l > 0} and D¯ its complement. For
the inactive players, we have x˜D¯ = 0. For the active players, the first order
conditions of social welfare maximization are: ∀l ∈ D,
f ′l
(
x˜l −
∑
k:k 6=l,k∈D
λklx˜k
)
− wl −
∑
j:j 6=l,j∈D
λljf
′
j
(
x˜j −
∑
i:i 6=j,i∈D
λij x˜i
)
−
∑
g:g 6=l,g∈D¯
λlgf
′
g
(
0−
∑
h:h 6=g,h∈D
λhgx˜h
)
= 0.
Let ei = f
′
i(.) for all i. We note ΛI×J the submatrix of Λ with rows in I ⊆ N
and columns in J ⊆ N . In matrix notation, the first order conditions for the
active players write
(I−Λ)D×D eD −ΛD×D¯ eD¯ −wD = 0,
where ΛD×D¯ denotes the (possibly rectangular) submatrix of Λ consisting of
rows with all the active players and columns with all the inactive players.
We obtain
x˜D = b
−
(
ΛD×D, (f
′)
−1 (
b+ (ΛD×D,φ (x˜D))
))
,
where φ(x˜D) = wD +ΛD×D¯ eD¯ and eD¯ = f
′(−(ΛD×D¯)
T x˜D).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us prove that the SO is interior. The first order
conditions provide the following inequalities:
∀l, f ′l
(
x˜l −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklx˜k
)
−
∑
j:j 6=l
λljf
′
j
(
x˜j −
∑
i:i 6=j
λijx˜i
)
≤ wl,
that is,
(I−Λ)
(
f ′
((
I−ΛT
)
x˜
))
≤ w,
or,
f ′
((
I−ΛT
)
x˜
)
≤ (I−Λ)−1w.
By assumption, f ′(0) >> (I−Λ)−1w ≥ w, thus ((I−Λ)−1w)l ∈ [wl, f
′
l (0)).
Hence,
x˜ ≥
(
I−ΛT
)
x˜ ≥ (f ′)
−1 (
(I−Λ)−1w
)
>> 0 .
Since the SO is interior, the first order conditions provide actually the fol-
lowing equalities,
(I−Λ)
(
f ′
((
I−ΛT
)
x˜
))
= w,
thus
x˜ =
(
I−ΛT
)−1
(f ′)
−1 (
(I−Λ)−1w
)
.
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Proof of Theorem 2. At equilibrium, the FOCs are for all l,
f ′l
(
xˆl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxˆk
)
= wl,
since the PSNE is interior. Under A0 and A1, the SO may be corner. Let
D = {l : x˜l > 0}. For l ∈ D, the FOCs for the efficient profile are
f ′l
(
x˜l −
∑
k:k 6=l,k∈D
λklx˜k
)
− wl −
∑
j:j 6=l
λljf
′
j
(
x˜j −
∑
i:i 6=j
λijx˜i
)
= 0,
and since f ′l > 0, we have
f ′l
(
x˜l −
∑
k:k 6=l,k∈D
λklx˜k
)
≥ wl,
with a strict inequality if λlj > 0 for some j, i.e., if l is not a sink player.
Now,
f ′l
(
xˆl −
∑
k:k 6=l,k∈D
λklxˆk
)
≤ f ′l
(
xˆl −
∑
k:k 6=l
λklxˆk
)
= wl,
so,
f ′l
(
xˆl −
∑
k:k 6=l,k∈D
λklxˆk
)
≤ f ′l
(
x˜l −
∑
k:k 6=l,k∈D
λklx˜k
)
.
The function f ′l being decreasing, we have
x˜l −
∑
k:k 6=l,k∈D
λklx˜k ≤ xˆl −
∑
k:k 6=l,k∈D
λklxˆk,
that is, in matrix notation,(
I−ΛT
)
D×D
x˜D ≤
(
I−ΛT
)
D×D
xˆD.
Then, since
(
I−ΛT
)
D×D
has also a nonnegative inverse with
((
I−ΛT
)
D×D
)−1
≥ ID,
it comes by composition
x˜D ≤ xˆD,
and x˜l < xˆl whenever l is not a sink player. If D 6= N , then x˜ < xˆ since
xˆN\D >> 0 = x˜N\D. If D = N , there is a player which is not a sink player
(since Λ 6= 0), so x˜ < xˆ.
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Proof of Corollary 1. If there are no sink players, then x˜l < xˆl for all l (see
the proof of Theorem 2). Hence, x˜ << xˆ, i.e., a social tragedy appears.
Proof of Theorem 3. (If). According to Propositions 1 and 2, a social tragedy
holds if
0 <<
(
I−ΛT
)−1 (
(f ′)
−1
(w)− (f ′)
−1
(I−Λ)−1w
)
.
Put X = (f ′)−1(w)− (f ′)−1(I−Λ)−1w. Then, the condition is equivalent to,
∀l, ∃k /
(
I−ΛT
)−1
lk
×Xk > 0
or equivalently,
∀l, ∃k, ∃p ≥ 0 /
((
ΛT
)p)
lk
> 0 and
(
(I−Λ)−1w
)
k
> wk
that is,
∀l, ∃k, ∃p ≥ 0, ∃q ≥ 1 /
((
ΛT
)p)
lk
> 0 and (Λqw)k > 0
since (I−Λ)−1 − I =
∑∞
i=1Λ
i. By transposition,
∀l, ∃k, ∃p ≥ 0, ∃q ≥ 1 / (Λp)kl > 0 and (Λ
qw)k > 0
or
∀l, ∃k, ∃p ≥ 0, ∃q ≥ 1 / (Λp)kl > 0 and (Λ
q)k.w > 0
or
∀l, ∃k, ∃p ≥ 0, ∃q ≥ 1 / (Λp)kl > 0 and (Λ
q)k. 6= 0
T
since w >> 0. Assume l is not an isolated player. Then either l has an influ-
ential neighbor or a vulnerable neighbor. If l admits an influential neighbor
l′, then take k = l′, p = 1 and q = 1 so (Λ1)l′l = λl′l > 0 and (Λ
1)l′. 6= 0
T.
Otherwise, l admits a vulnerable neighbor l′′, then take k = l, p = 0 and
q = 1 so (Λ0)ll = 1 > 0 and (Λ
1)l. 6= 0
T since (Λ1)ll′′ = λll′′ > 0.
(Only if). Assume there exists some isolated player l. As part of a PSNE
xˆl = x
∗
l since l has no interaction with other players. And as part of SO
x˜l = x
∗
l since the social welfare function is separable with respect to xl.
Thus, xˆl = x˜l = x
∗
l .
Proof of Corollary 2. (If). Let I = {isolated players} and Ic = {non-isolated
players}. Consider the subgame GIc(Λ, f ,w) played by non-isolated players
in the subnetwork ΛIc×Ic with vertex I
c. Then, A0 and A2 hold since ΛIc×Ic
has positive inverse too, and b+(ΛIc×Ic , .) = (b
+(Λ, .))Ic×Ic . By Theorem 3,
a social tragedy appears with x˜(Ic) << xˆ(Ic). Since isolated player do not
intervene at PSNE nor at SO we have xˆIc = xˆ(I
c) and x˜Ic = x˜(I
c) hence
x˜Ic << xˆIc . And x˜I = xˆI = x
∗
I , so a social tragedy for non-isolated players
appears.
(Only if). If l is isolated, then x˜l = xˆl = x
∗
l (see Theorem 3).
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